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FROM THE TECHNICAL TO THE PERSONAL: 
TEACHING AND LEARNING HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION 
AND REFORM 
ALLISON K. HOFFMAN*, WHITNEY A. BROWN** & 
LINDSAY CUTLER *** 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Fall of 2016, I taught Health Law and Policy for the fourth 
consecutive semester. In this repeat loop, one thing has become increasingly 
clear: the aspect of this survey course that I work with most closely as a 
scholar—the regulation of health care financing and insurance, including the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act1 (ACA)—is also the material that I 
find the most challenging to teach. Every time I reflect on teaching this 
material, and hear from students about how they learn this material, the thing 
that stands out is how critical it is that my students understand the profound 
impact that this technical subject has on individuals’ lives. 
As my touchstone in teaching health insurance regulation and reform, I 
strive to connect with the human impact of this convoluted field of regulation. 
When I teach state and federal insurance regulations and ACA policies, I delve 
 
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Thank you to students like Lindsay and Whitney, who 
make teaching a pleasure and an opportunity for me to continue to grow and learn. I dedicate this 
Article to my health law and policy instructor and mentor, Ted Marmor, whose invitation to work 
as his Teaching Assistant provided my first steps into teaching. 
** J.D. Candidate 2017, UCLA School of Law. A class—even one as inherently interesting as 
Health Law and Policy—is only as good as the professor who teaches it. I feel so lucky that mine 
was Professor Hoffman. I am grateful for her mentorship and to have witnessed (and been the 
beneficiary of) her matchless ability to instill her passion for the discipline in her students. 
Thanks also to Lindsay for many thought-provoking discussions in class, in preparing this 
Article, and beyond. 
*** J.D. Candidate 2017, UCLA School of Law, David J. Epstein Program in Public Interest Law 
and Policy. I am so grateful to have taken Health Law and Policy with Professor Hoffman at 
UCLA Law, and for the invaluable experience of co-authoring this Article. It is rare to have the 
opportunity to reflect on and think through the experience of learning with both a classmate and a 
professor, and I am extremely thankful to them both. 
 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 
Stat. 1029. Subsequent references in this Article to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act refer to the Act, as amended. 
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into the technical, and then zoom out to consider how these technical details 
affect individuals and their security and well-being and, in turn, what this 
impact suggests about our social values. 
Health insurance regulation simultaneously shapes and is an expression of 
social values.2 It defines the types of harms we expect individuals to shoulder 
on their own and what we are willing to mitigate collectively, as a society. 
Every rule that expands the scope of insurance—whether private or social 
insurance—is a signal of greater social solidarity with respect to each other’s 
health. Every contraction of the scope of insurance is the opposite, and leaves 
individuals more vulnerable to poor health or financial insecurity due to high 
health care spending. These broader implications are what draw me to the 
topic—as a teacher and as a scholar. My ultimate goal is for my students to 
understand this social meaning: why insurance is regulated as it is, how that 
regulation reflects larger social values, and the impact—both intended and 
unintended—that insurance regulation has on the shape of our society. 
Teaching health insurance regulation is objectively challenging, more so 
than most other subjects I teach, as I discuss below. In addition, I find it 
personally challenging to teach it because I am deeply immersed in its 
intricacies. Depth of knowledge in a field is undoubtedly valuable for a 
professor. I often draw on my practice experience as a health law associate 
when I teach. I can still remember the fear of negotiating a HIPAA3 business 
associate agreement for the first time, or flipping furiously through Stark Law4 
regulations at midnight, while eating potato chips and chocolate from the Lindt 
store in the lobby of the Boston office of Ropes & Gray, where I worked. 
When I teach HIPAA or the Stark Law, I can still remember learning them 
myself. But after working on health insurance regulation and reform for nearly 
a decade as a scholar, I find it harder to identify which aspects of this topic are 
obvious and which are challenging and counterintuitive. Simply put, too much 
of it makes sense to me. I am reminded of this fact each time I teach. As I map 
out the many ways we pay for health care in the United States—group versus 
individual plans, self-insured versus fully-insured employer plans, public 
versus private insurance—and how each category is subject to different rules 
 
 2. See Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (2011); Allison K. 
Hoffman, Reimagining the Risk of Long-Term Care, 16 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 239 
(2016). We use health care “financing” and “insurance” interchangeably throughout this Article 
to refer to the various types of private insurance and public insurance that pay for health care. 
 3. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936. 
 4. The Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989 is called the “Stark Law” in honor of its 
sponsor, Representative Fortney “Pete” Stark. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012); 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.350–
411.389 (2015). 
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and regulatory bodies, students look at me with puzzlement. Their looks 
remind me that these distinctions are illogical. 
When asked to write this Article on teaching health insurance regulation 
and reform, I figured I should confirm that what I thought worked in the 
classroom was actually working. To this end, I asked two of my former 
students to reflect on learning health insurance regulation and reform in my 
Health Law and Policy class, and I discovered that some of my aims were 
hitting the mark and others could benefit from refinement, in ways that I will 
discuss below. In Part I of this Article, I describe my goals and approaches in 
teaching these topics as well as why this material can be difficult to teach. My 
student co-authors reflect on their own experiences in learning this material in 
Part II, including what they took away from it and what questions remain. Both 
of my co-authors have a deep interest in health law, and each came to my class 
with different, relevant background knowledge and work experience. In the 
final Part of the Article, I highlight how my co-authors’ insights have informed 
my teaching. 
I.  REFLECTIONS ON TEACHING HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION AND 
REFORM 
A. What I Cover in a Health Law and Policy Survey Course 
I teach health insurance regulation in two different settings: a seminar 
focused specifically on this topic and a four-unit survey class on health law, 
more broadly. Teaching the seminar is more straightforward. Fourteen weeks 
are devoted exclusively to health insurance, which provides ample time to 
cover both its normative and technical aspects.5 Because it’s a seminar, the 
students tend to have more tolerance for a sampling of topics and a 
theoretically driven approach, with fewer seeking the legal practice version of 
the material. Plus, having self-selected into a course focused solely on health 
insurance, most students are actively interested in understanding the nuances of 
the topic, as opposed to students who have enrolled in a survey course called 
“Health Law and Policy.” In Spring of 2017, for example, the seminar students 
enthusiastically spent five weeks researching and critiquing key policy 
elements of Republican proposals to repeal and replace the ACA—ranging 
from health savings accounts to insurance competition across state lines to 
 
 5. I spend the first several classes of my insurance seminar building a normative framework 
for thinking about health insurance. The second part of the course—three to four classes—aims to 
illustrate the status of health insurance and health care in the United States historically, before the 
enactment of the ACA, employing empirical studies to tease out why we spend more on health 
care and get worse outcomes than other countries do. The final and longest part of the seminar 
examines how the ACA changed the world of health financing and regulation and selects from 
hot topics in health insurance regulation and reform at the time of the class. 
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block grants or per capita financing for the Medicaid program. The students 
expect the course to be technical, and they generally embrace its complexity. 
The task of teaching health insurance regulation in the survey course is 
much more difficult and is the focus of the rest of this Article. UCLA Law 
generally offers the health law survey course annually, and between twenty 
and forty students enroll. The class covers topics related to law and medicine 
(e.g., privacy, informed consent, medical malpractice), the more complex 
regulatory health law topics (e.g., fraud and abuse laws, licensure and 
accreditation, tax status, and antitrust), and health care financing regulation and 
reform. 
I spend about eight or nine two-hour class sessions on health care 
financing: two classes that provide an overview of private health insurance, 
public health insurance, and reimbursement (covering everything from how 
hospitals set prices to Medicare reimbursement rules); three on managed care 
liability and preemption doctrine under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA);6 and three to four on the ACA and ongoing 
health reform efforts. What results is an action-packed four weeks and a fire-
hose introduction to one of the most complicated and important topics in health 
law and indeed in modern American society. 
B. What Makes Things Challenging 
Several factors make teaching health insurance regulation especially 
difficult. Students’ reasons for taking a health law course diverge most 
strongly in this unit. This is where the future health law practitioners part ways 
from students who are simply seeking insight into a timely topic—one that 
they see in the New York Times headlines and hear their medical student 
friends and physician family members either cheering or complaining about. 
The students who plan to practice health law know they must understand the 
rules and regulatory structures of insurance. They will negotiate contracts 
between insurers and providers or litigate them when they go wrong. They will 
answer client questions about the ACA and about state insurance regulation 
compliance. These students tend to push their way through difficult classes on 
ERISA preemption and managed care liability because they expect knowing it 
will behoove them in the long run. Students who come to the course for 
general edification, however, can lose steam in these classes. 
Another challenge is that individual preconceptions and biases can impede 
learning. In 2009, I sat in on a seminar that now-Dean of University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, Ted Ruger, was teaching as a visiting professor at 
Harvard Law School. He devoted a class to discussion of the so-called 
individual mandate to carry health insurance—then a requirement just in 
 
 6. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in part at 29 U.S.C. ch. 18). 
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Massachusetts7 and the topic that I examined during my fellowship at 
Harvard.8 He asked the students their opinions about it, and, from a crowd of 
well-educated Harvard law students, he got a typical, and relatively 
uninformed, “young invincible”-style response: self-interested resistance to 
having to pay more than one’s “fair” share. The twenty-something law students 
uniformly saw it as patently unfair (to them) and, as a result, bad public policy. 
This viewpoint is endemic in our individualistic, bootstrap society and can 
impede a student’s ability to internalize evidence that could persuade one to 
believe otherwise—that the individual mandate might be a just policy. It also 
arises from a shallow or narrow understanding of insurance. Even if insurers 
had perfect information, it would be impossible to price insurance so that it 
precisely captures individual risk (in other words, there is no perfectly 
actuarially “fair” insurance).9 Though some expensive conditions recur from 
year to year, many expensive health risks are unpredictable and 
uncontrollable.10 This viewpoint also typically assumes that people in poor 
health have had some hand in it themselves. Thus, it would make sense to 
charge them more if they are unhealthy of their own accord; but designating 
what is under someone’s control—and, by implication, less worthy of 
collective assistance—is more complicated than what appears at first blush. 
Even risk factors, such as smoking or poor nutrition, that seem to be within an 
individual’s full control, may not be.11 Knowing and internalizing these 
facts—that insurance could never be “fair” from an actuarial perspective and 
that, for the most part, people cannot control whether they need expensive 
 
 7. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, 2006 Mass. 
Acts 77, 92 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2 (2008)). 
 8. Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, 
and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2010). 
 9. While some believe that an efficient insurance market could eliminate interpersonal 
redistribution by charging each individual a perfectly actuarially rated premium (defined as the 
exact amount the individual is likely to consume in health care costs over the coverage period), 
the reality is that even in the most “efficient” of insurance markets, insurance is redistributive 
among insureds. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 77–78 (1986). 
 10. Mark W. Stanton, The High Concentration of U.S. Health Care Expenditures, 
RESEARCH IN ACTION, June 2006, at 1, 5 (“An acute episode of pneumonia or a motor vehicle 
accident might lead to an expensive hospitalization for an otherwise healthy person, who might 
be in the top 1 percent for just that year but have few expenses in subsequent years.”). 
 11. See Jonathan S. Feinstein, The Relationship Between Socioeconomic Status and Health: 
A Review of the Literature, 71 MILBANK Q. 279, 306 (1993); Neil Pearce & George Davey Smith, 
Is Social Capital the Key to Inequalities in Health?, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 122, 125 (2003) 
(describing that health is related to social factors because of “the influence of social cohesion on 
health-related behaviors”); see also S.A. Reijneveld, The Impact of Individual and Area 
Characteristics on Urban Socioeconomic Differences in Health and Smoking, 27 INT’L J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 33, 35, 38 (1998) (finding that poor health behaviors in impoverished areas 
overwhelmingly are due to individuals’ low socioeconomic status). 
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medical care—makes it harder to take the young invincible stance of indignant 
opposition to mandatory insurance coverage. 
Yet another challenge is that insurance regulation is a daunting topic, even 
for the most ambitious student. Students must first understand how insurance 
works. Insurance is about managing and spreading risk, and risk is a 
notoriously difficult concept to understand.12 It deals in probabilities and 
unusual events that are often hard to relate to. Regulations, in turn, aim to keep 
insurers financially solvent and to direct how risk is spread, and among whom. 
These basic concepts are intimidating, even to many law professors. 
To make matters worse, there is no singular approach to health insurance 
in the United States. In many other countries, students would find something 
more akin to an insurance “system,” as a starting point.13 The United States 
lacks a singular, coherent health insurance system.14 Rather, Americans 
finance their health care in many ways, each regulated differently.15 At the 
highest conceptual level, people pay for care with private insurance, public 
insurance, or out of pocket.16 Each of these categories divides into many 
subcategories. Private insurance is most often obtained through an employer, a 
particular defining characteristic of the U.S. approach. But some people buy it 
on their own directly from an insurer, increasingly so after the ACA made it 
easier for people to get and afford insurance in this way.17 Public financing 
also takes various forms. Medicaid, which is the largest public insurance 
program, currently insures about sixty-two million low-income or disabled 
 
 12. For an overview of cognitive biases with respect to risk and uncertainty, see Christine 
Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 203–25 (2006). See 
also Howell E. Jackson, Accounting for Social Security Benefits, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC 
FINANCE 261, 271–75 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006). 
 13. This assertion is not completely true, because most countries’ health financing systems 
involve some mix of public and private insurance, but most do have a more straightforward 
primary, typically public mode of financing insurance for the whole population that people can 
subsequently add onto or opt out of. See, e.g., THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE 
DIVIDE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY (Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., 2014) 
(cataloging the mix of public and private health care financing in over a dozen heterogeneous 
countries). 
 14. See THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS (Einer 
Elhauge ed., 2010). 
 15. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Access to Health Insurance and Health Benefits, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & 
William M. Sage eds., 2017) (describing each of these forms of payment, as well as charity care 
and government provision). 
 16. Id. 
 17. In 2015, 177 million people reported employer-based private coverage and 50 million 
reported directly purchased health insurance coverage. JESSICA C. BARNETT & MARINA S. 
VORNOVITSKY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 
2015, at 4 (2016). 
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beneficiaries using both state and federal funds.18 Before the ACA, Medicaid 
eligibility was “categorical” (and it still is in some states). Eligibility was not 
simply based on being poor. To qualify, an individual also needed to be under 
age eighteen, a parent of a dependent child, pregnant, or disabled. The second-
largest public insurance program, Medicare, covers fifty-two million elderly or 
disabled individuals.19 Other public programs provide benefits for children 
whose families’ incomes are too high to qualify for Medicaid (State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program), American Indians and Alaska Natives (Indian 
Health Service) and military and veterans (TRICARE and CHAMPUS). And, 
even after major reform aimed at increasing the number of insured Americans, 
nine percent of people remain uninsured, some of whom fell through the cracks 
of the ACA20 and others, mostly undocumented immigrants, who were 
intentionally excluded.21 
A student must understand this convoluted picture of health care financing 
before beginning to examine its regulation. Take, for example, the legal 
question of whether a managed care company may be liable for denying a 
beneficiary medical care. To answer this question, it is necessary first to 
identify if the beneficiary gets her health benefits through an employer, on her 
own from an insurance company, or from a public source. Next, a student must 
understand the business structure of the plan. Who makes utilization decisions? 
Are the doctors employed, or are they independent contractors? How are 
doctors paid and does the payment structure affect medical decisions and 
denials?22 These threshold questions, necessary precursors to assessing 
liability, can themselves be difficult to grasp. 
A final challenge for students is that health insurance policy and doctrine 
are steeped in questions of politics and morality, especially so with respect to 
legal challenges to the ACA, a lightning rod for conflicting social values. 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Of those people still uninsured in 2015, when asked their primary reason for being 
uninsured, nearly half reported that insurance remains too expensive, nine percent said that they 
chose not to buy insurance, twenty percent said that they did not know about or think that the 
individual mandate applies to them, and eleven percent tried to get coverage and failed. Key Facts 
About the Uninsured Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Sept 29, 2016), http://kff.org/un 
insured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/ [https://perma.cc/B6GY-AZXR]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). This 
is the first case on managed care liability in the Health Care Law and Ethics textbook edited by 
Hall, Bobinski, and Orentlicher. To understand the court’s decision, readers must understand that 
the HMO contracts with doctors who are organized within an Independent Practice Association, 
where physicians receive capitated payments and year-end bonuses, depending on patients’ 
specialist and hospital utilization. Just to understand this arrangement is difficult yet necessary to 
make sense of the court’s decision that there is a colorable question of fact with regard to liability 
for the health maintenance organization in this case. 
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National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius’s inquiry into the 
legality of the individual mandate had as much to do with conflict over who 
should pay for health care and who should be able to get it as it did about what 
Congress can do according to Article I of the Constitution—even though 
Justice Roberts’s opinion, for the most part, expressly rests on the latter.23 The 
broad-reaching displacement of state insurance regulation by ERISA is shaped 
more by the business lobby and the particular stronghold of employer-
sponsored insurance than by any clear picture of statutory intent. To 
understand the development of legal doctrine, students must be willing to delve 
equally into the explicit reasoning of each case and the normative and political 
questions underlying it. 
C. My Strategies (and Gimmicks) 
To overcome the challenges of teaching this complex, technical, and 
controversial subject, I attempt to tie the technical aspects of health insurance 
to a human face, highlighting the impact on individuals. Every student has a 
story of her experiences with the health care system and with health insurance, 
related to her own health, a parent’s health, or, as came up in class this past 
fall, with a pet’s health and health insurance (in all seriousness). This personal 
contact makes it easier for students to think about the practical impact of health 
insurance regulation. I offer here five examples of the types of images, videos, 
and hypotheticals on which I rely to attempt to make difficult aspects of health 
insurance regulation more human and accessible. In addition, I share my own 
experiences navigating health insurance and health care choices and, even with 
my expertise, how I have found doing so frustrating or impossible at times. My 
general approach is to dive deeply into the technical aspects and then to 
resurface to consider the broader effect of the technical rules on individuals, 
families, and communities. 
1. The Health Care Spending Curve: A Picture that Is Worth a Thousand 
Words to Introduce Health Insurance Theory 
On day one of my health law class, I introduce the idea of insurance, 
including what it is, how it works, and what types of normative questions it 
raises. I begin with the famous curve of health care spending to illustrate the 
80/20 rule (a version of which is illustrated in Figure 124)—that twenty percent 
of the population is responsible for eighty percent of the health care spending 
every year. 
 
 23. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 24. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., UNDERSTANDING U.S. HEALTH 
CARE SPENDING 3 (July 2011), http://www.bcnys.org/inside/health/2011/HealthCarePremiums 
NIHCM0711.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP7P-YJL3] (analyzing data from the National Health 
Expenditure Accounts at cms.gov). 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Health Care Spending in 2008 
Most health law professors probably introduce this curve at some point in 
the semester. I start with this image on day one for two reasons. The first is 
simply to get my students to understand the risk-spreading function of 
insurance. Some people will spend more on health care this year than they 
could possibly afford on their own, more in fact than the average U.S. 
household earns in a year and more even than the median household’s net 
worth.25 Then I ask them to consider who makes up the space under that curve, 
and we imagine the many people who might have an expensive year, from the 
middle-aged man who has a heart attack, to the woman who has a baby, to the 
twenty-something with a chronic disease, to the child diagnosed with leukemia 
or born prematurely, to the paradigmatic aging person in need of constant care. 
This exercise humanizes the curve and illustrates that an insurance risk pool is 
just a group of individuals, like those sitting together in the classroom. Next, 
we discuss predictability of being in the high end of the spending curve—some 
 
 25. The average household income was $56,516 in 2015. BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR ET AL., 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015, at 5 (Sept. 2016), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P7MB-93KX]. Median household net worth was $68,828 in 2011. MARINA 
VORNOVITSKY ET AL., DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD WEALTH IN THE U.S.: 2000 TO 2011, at 7, 
https://www.census.gov/people/wealth/files/Wealth%20distribution%202000%20to%202011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PM8D-J9GJ]. Average spending for the top one percent of spenders in 2009 
was on average $90,000 and for the top five percent was on average $41,000. NAT’L INST. FOR 
HEALTH CARE MGMT., THE CONCENTRATION OF HEALTH CARE SPENDING 2 (July 2012), 
http://www.nihcm.org/pdf/DataBrief3%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3CR-EGX8]. 
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are there more predictably, like the person with a chronic disease or the woman 
who had a baby, while others find themselves there with little to no warning 
due to a diagnosis of cancer, a heart attack, or a car accident.26 It is, at least to 
some degree, impossible to know which person in the pool will be expensive 
this year. 
The second reason I spend time with this image on the first day is to begin 
to frame different normative visions of health insurance, contrasting in 
particular one of actuarial fairness versus one of solidarity.27 Considering that 
some people are very expensive and sometimes for reasons outside of their 
control, who should bear the costs of their medical care? 
For those who ascribe to a model of actuarial fairness, in a perfect world, 
over a lifetime, an insured individual would only pay in premiums what she 
spends on health care (plus administrative costs and reasonable insurer profit). 
Insurance is like a borrowing and savings mechanism. Some years an insured 
individual pays more than she spends and others she pays less than she needs, 
but if insurance works “correctly,” she comes out even or near even over the 
course of her lifetime. This first vision favors only intrapersonal distribution of 
health care costs over a lifetime. 
A contrasting vision is that insurance does and should facilitate 
redistribution.28 In a perfect world, an insured would pay premiums hoping 
that she never needs to use those dollars on her own care and that, instead, they 
pay for care for people who are less lucky than she is. This second vision is 
based on interpersonal distribution of health care costs and insurance as a form 
of social solidarity, a mechanism where everyone contributes so that the less 
fortunate are able to access the care they need. In this view of insurance, the 
goal is to distribute resources from the flat of the curve on the left side of 
Figure 1—from the fifty percent of people in the United States who spend 
nothing on health care in a given year—to those in the steep of the curve that 
year, who likely could not finance the care they need out-of-pocket. This is a 
more capacious view of what justice demands and one that I plant in my 
students’ minds early so that, even if they disagree with it, they will at least be 
cognizant of this alternative as the semester rolls out. 
2. Insurance Gaps Before and After the Affordable Care Act Through 
the Lens of One Man’s Search for Health Insurance 
Later in the semester, I begin the health care financing unit with two days 
on public and private health insurance, describing the evolution and 
 
 26. Stanton, supra note 10, at 5. 
 27. See, e.g., Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH 
POL., POL’Y & L. 287, 289 (1993) (outlining two visions of distributive justice for health 
insurance, solidarity versus actuarial fairness). 
 28. Id. 
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implications of how we pay for health care in the United States. At the end of 
these classes, to make sure the students understand the many parts in 
application, I pose a hypothetical about Rick, a fifty-year-old man living in 
Tennessee who has a chronic health condition and has been laid off from a 
relatively low-wage job, leaving him unemployed and living off meager 
unemployment benefits. I ask the students what his options were for 
maintaining health insurance, which he critically needs, before the ACA.29 The 
answer emerges that he had no viable option. Some people in his position 
might take advantage of COBRA, a federal law preceding the ACA that allows 
some people with employer health plans to keep their same coverage for at 
least eighteen months after losing a job.30 But, to do so, Rick would have to 
pay the full cost of the health insurance benefits, including the employer’s 
former contribution plus his own, which he cannot afford. As a single adult, he 
was not categorically eligible for Medicaid before the ACA—at least not until 
his disease results in disability. He is not old enough for Medicare. He suffers 
from a preexisting health condition that would have precluded him from 
purchasing affordable individual coverage. He is sick and out of luck. In fact, 
his inability to get health insurance, despite his desperate need for it, is 
emblematic of what motivated the passage of the ACA. 
Then, we consider if he is better off after the ACA. Unfortunately, the 
answer is no, providing an interesting twist on this hypothetical that I used for 
years prior to the ACA’s passage to illustrate the need for reform. Under the 
original design of the ACA, he would have had access to Medicaid since he 
earns under the federal poverty level. The ACA directed that states eliminate 
categorical eligibility so that anyone earning under 138% of the federal poverty 
level could enroll in Medicaid. States that did not expand eligibility risked 
losing the entirety of the federal funding they were getting for Medicaid. 
Responding to a legal challenge to this requirement, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that this choice—to expand or else lose the federal funds that constitute on 
average ten percent of a state’s budget—was unconstitutionally coercive.31 As 
a result of this decision, a state can now choose either to keep its pre-ACA 
categorical eligibility rules and funding levels or to expand its program to 
everyone earning up to 138% of the federal poverty level and receive 
additional federal funding. As of January 2017, thirty-two states had adopted 
the expansion.32 
 
 29. I believe this hypothetical is loosely based on a slide authored by Sara Rosenbaum. 
 30. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 
§ 1001(c)(2), 100 Stat. 82, 223–24. 
 31. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2574 (2012). 
 32. Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 
(Jan. 1, 2017), http://kff.org/health-reform/slide/current-status-of-the-medicaid-expansion-deci 
sion/ [https://perma.cc/9ZAS-PYGW]. 
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Rick’s home state of Tennessee did not expand its Medicaid program; 
rather, it maintained pre-ACA categorical eligibility rules. As a result, Rick 
now embodies an unfortunate unintended result of the ACA. He earns too little 
to qualify for subsidized private insurance on the ACA’s health insurance 
exchanges, which the ACA made available only to people earning 100% to 
400% of the federal poverty level based on the assumption that anyone earning 
under 100% would be eligible for Medicaid coverage, and he does not have 
access to Medicaid in light of the Supreme Court’s decision. The process of 
thinking through every different iteration and realizing that Rick, a middle-
aged man with a chronic health condition, has no viable option for insurance 
coverage even after the ACA is eye-opening for many of my students. It brings 
to life the problems of building out reform on a fragmented financing system. 
3. Investigative Journalism on Out-of-Network Pricing and the Games 
Providers Pay 
I spend one class explicitly discussing the price of health care and 
approach it in an intentionally provocative way, by highlighting some of the 
worst practices, including chargemaster pricing, which can result in 
indefensibly high medical bills for uninsured patients, and providers’ behavior 
to maximize Medicare reimbursement, which toes the line between strategic 
and fraudulent. Students read Steven Brill’s famous Time Magazine article 
“Bitter Pill,”33 exposing inflated hospital list prices, and a series of Wall Street 
Journal articles on health care pricing and billing practices from the “Medicare 
Unmasked” series that won the Journal a Pulitzer Prize in investigative 
reporting in 2015. This year, I added articles about the astronomical increases 
in prices for prescription drugs and medical devices when they come under the 
ownership of for-profit companies like Valeant, Turing Pharmaceuticals, and 
Mylan (whose six-fold increase in the price of the life-saving EpiPen device 
recently captured the public’s attention).34 In each of these articles, the writer 
emphasizes the human impact of high health care prices: low-income people 
filing for bankruptcy over six-figure medical bills or scrambling to figure out 
how to pay for life-saving treatment, older people suffering harms from being 
discharged from skilled nursing facilities too quickly or being held there longer 
than ideal for their rehabilitation, and parents struggling to afford potentially 
life-saving EpiPens for their children with allergies. 
Each of these pieces is shocking. My goal is provocation, in part. It is also 
to make explicit that health care is a business, and often an extremely 
profitable one, where business decisions cost people their health or their lives. 
Finally, I highlight that any financing system creates incentives, and people 
 
 33. Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME (Feb. 20, 2013). 
 34. See Jonathan D. Rockoff, Mylan Faces Scrutiny Over EpiPen Price Increases, WALL ST. 
J. (Aug. 24, 2016). 
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respond to those incentives. This is useful framing for later discussion of self-
referral and anti-kickback laws. 
4. Video Hypothetical on the Bottom Line of ERISA Preemption 
With ERISA preemption, we delve more deeply into the technical than 
with any other unit in the class. ERISA, passed in 1974, regulates employee 
benefits; the law was passed to create safeguards for pensions but included 
health and other employee benefits in its regulatory ambit as an afterthought,35 
one that has had a tremendous impact. This is because ERISA preempts, or 
pushes aside, state laws and remedies that overlap with it, and has left a 
vacuum of regulation and remedies in its wake. The law directs that ERISA 
supersedes any state laws that “relate to” an employer health plan, known as 
section 514 preemption. ERISA also prevents someone from seeking state 
remedies if she is harmed because of a denial of benefits under an employer 
health plan, known as section 502 preemption.36 ERISA preemption is 
difficult, both because of its complexity and because of the inconsistency in the 
way the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute. Yet for students interested 
in health reform or civil justice, who need a functional understanding of how 
benefits are regulated, understanding ERISA is critical. 
There is real risk of losing some students in the ERISA morass and never 
getting them back again. I rely on several tools to try to keep students aboard. 
First, I chart out ERISA preemption visually, using everything from pictures of 
concentric circles of preemption (Figure 2, below) to flowcharts.37 I start with 
this simple visual to illustrate how the two parts of ERISA preemption work 
together, and as the unit proceeds, I plot each case onto this roadmap. 
  
 
 35. See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: 
A POLITICAL HISTORY 2 (2004). 
 36. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a)(1)(B), 
88 Stat. 829, 891 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)). 
 37. Thank you to Jessica Mantel for sharing her fabulous flowcharts with me. 
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Figure 2. Charting ERISA Preemption 
Second, I strategically place our unit on the Affordable Care Act right after 
ERISA preemption to reel possible defectors back in. Finally, and most 
importantly, I attempt to illuminate the human impact of ERISA preemption 
using an in-class exercise, so students understand and remember the bottom 
line of this technical jurisprudence, even if they forget all the doctrinal details. 
This exercise focuses on ERISA section 502, which allows beneficiaries to 
bring a federal civil suit if denied benefits owed under an employer health 
plan.38 The Supreme Court has interpreted section 502 to preclude any state 
tort action seeking remedy for harms that arise from such a denial.39 This 
means that the only way a person can seek remedy for these harms is in federal 
court under ERISA section 502. In conjunction, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the remedies available under section 502 very narrowly, allowing 
compensation only for the value of benefits denied and the payment of future 
benefits.40 As a result, if a beneficiary is denied care due to her under her 
employer health plan and she is seriously harmed because of that denial, 
ERISA leaves her without remedy for these harms. She can recoup the cost of 
 
 38. Section 502(a)(1)(B) says that a beneficiary may bring a civil action to “recover benefits 
due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to 
clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” § 502(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. at 891. 
 39. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004). 
 40. Id. at 222–23 (Ginsburg J., concurring). See Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 817 (6th Cir. 
1987); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 534–38 (9th Cir. 1986); Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 
651, 754–61 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 818 (1992). 
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care denied but not damages related to lost work or disability or death that 
results from the denial. 
Even after we discuss the case that expressly affirms this rule, Aetna v. 
Davila, it can still be difficult for students to internalize its counterintuitive 
and, arguably, cruel results: a health plan that negligently denies someone care 
does not have to compensate her for harms that result. In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Ginsburg expresses her disapproval of this rule, calling on Congress to 
revisit an “unjust” preemption regime.41 
To drive home this lesson, I use a video hypothetical from an NBC Nightly 
News story about Michael Fields, a forty-six-year-old man whose insurer 
repeatedly denied his physician’s request for a cardiac nuclear stress test to 
look for blockages in his arteries.42 The news story is instructive at multiple 
levels. First, the test was denied by a company called MedSolutions, a medical 
benefits management company that was hired to review requests on behalf of 
Fields’s insurer, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Delaware. Students can consider 
how the existence of a company like MedSolutions fits into the story of 
defensive medicine. Studies point to increased use of diagnostics, especially in 
cardiovascular care, as a response to tort liability concerns.43 MedSolutions 
could, in theory, use evidence-based medicine to counterbalance unwarranted 
overuse, but, in reality, it went too far. An investigation by the U.S. Senate 
Commerce Committee showed a pattern of inappropriate denials, perhaps 
unsurprising considering that MedSolutions’s compensation was contingent on 
achieving at least a twenty percent reduction in spending.44 
Fields’s denial was among those identified as wrongful. His doctor 
recommended the nuclear stress test; when the insurer denied it, the doctor 
appealed twice and both times the appeals were again denied. I ask students: 
“What if his doctor had given up at this point? Could the doctor be liable for 
negligent care? Would the insurer, or its agent, be liable for any harms Fields 
suffered because of this wrongful denial?” This last question is the one that 
reinforces the impact of ERISA preemption. Fields would have had to bring a 
federal claim for wrongful denial of benefits under ERISA section 502, 
because ERISA preempts any state tort claim. And if he won, he would recover 
only the value of benefits denied: the cost of the nuclear stress test. The 
question that drives home the enduring effect of ERISA preemption coupled 
 
 41. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J. concurring). 
 42. Lisa Myers, Rich Gardella & Azriel Relph, Insurer Denied Needed Medical Tests, 
Senate Finds, NBC NIGHTLY NEWS WITH BRIAN WILLIAMS (Apr. 18, 2011, 11:43 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42613298/ns/nbc_nightly_news_with_brian_williams/t/insurer-de 
nied-needed-medical-tests-senate-finds/#.WAfnpJMrJo4 [https://perma.cc/82X3-MW5T]. 
 43. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker, Elliott S. Fisher & Amitabh Chandra, Malpractice Liability 
Costs and the Practice of Medicine in the Medicare Program, 26 HEALTH AFF. 841 (2007). 
 44. Myers et al., supra note 42. 
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with the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of its available remedies is the 
following: “If Fields had died the following week of a heart attack because he 
did not get a timely nuclear stress test, what remedy could his widow have 
been able to seek in court?” The answer, students realize with disbelief, is the 
same: the cost of the stress test. Period.45 
Fortunately for Fields, his determined doctor sent him to the hospital for 
emergency care, where cardiologists found an artery blocked and performed 
quadruple heart bypass surgery the following day. By shifting to video and a 
compelling human story, I attempt to capture my students’ attention and 
heartstrings in order to underscore the impact of complex ERISA doctrine. 
Even if they do not remember the details of sections 514 and 502, most 
remember the story of Michael Fields. 
5. Buying Insurance on an ACA Exchange: This Cannot Be What They 
Intended? 
Finally, as we study the ACA and its insurance expansion, I ask my 
students to judge the effects of one part of the ACA expansion for themselves. 
I ask them to choose a health plan on the California health insurance exchange, 
Covered California, which has a shop-and-compare function for potential 
buyers. 
The experience of going onto Covered California’s website, entering their 
data, and trying to pick a plan usually illuminates several things. First, 
“choice” is a myth to a large degree in a world where plans are highly 
regulated. The benefits and cost-sharing structures are surprisingly similar 
among plans in similar categories, or “metal levels” (so named because plans 
are designated as platinum, gold, silver, or bronze, in order of decreasing 
actuarial value). Second, to the extent the plans are at all distinguishable on 
their face, the choice between plans is unnavigable even for discerning law 
students. It’s difficult to tell why premium prices differ from one plan to 
another, and to the extent premium variation is due to differences in provider 
networks, it is impossible to decipher and judge the relative value of different 
networks, especially in California where online provider directories are riddled 
with errors.46 There are consumer ratings on the plans, but it is unclear how 
reliable they may be or what exactly they reflect. Finally, when looking at 
 
 45. This example is a slight oversimplification because it shows a pattern and practice of 
wrongful denials that might expose MedSolutions and Blue Cross/Blue Shield to other legal 
claims, but the takeaway is that the most straightforward claim for wrongful denial of benefits 
would not allow a remedy for wrongful death. 
 46. See MANATT HEALTH & CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUND., DIRECTORY ASSISTANCE: 
MAINTAINING RELIABLE PROVIDER DIRECTORIES FOR HEALTH PLAN SHOPPERS 3, 5–6 (2015), 
http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/PDF%20D/PDF%20Directo 
ryAssistanceProvider.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7FB-2T55] (describing problems with the accuracy 
of California provider directories). 
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plans, students struggle to decide if it is better to pay more upfront for a plan 
with a low deductible or to risk it, opt for a high-deductible plan, and hope for 
a healthy year. 
In one fell swoop, this exercise pulls the rug out from under the idea of 
relying on smart consumer purchase decisions to send market signals to 
improve health insurance and health care delivery—the theoretical idea 
underlying the exchanges and much of modern health law and policy, 
including recent Republican proposals for reform.47 It reveals that, even in a 
state with a relatively good marketplace experience, most insurance consumers 
are taking a shot in the dark. 
II.  REFLECTIONS ON LEARNING HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION AND 
REFORM 
Since all these efforts are aimed at helping my students understand health 
insurance regulation and reform, I thought it would be useful to hear from the 
intended audience. This Part is authored by two of my former students, 
Whitney Brown and Lindsay Cutler, who discuss why they took Health Law 
and Policy, what they found most interesting or memorable about the unit on 
insurance regulation and reform, and what they were left wondering or wanting 
to know at the end of the semester. Of course, every student’s experience is 
different, but my hope is that these reflections illuminate what comes through 
most strongly to my students and what would benefit from more refinement, 
which I address briefly in the Conclusion. 
A. Defining “Health Law”: Reflections by Whitney Brown 
I came to law school with a particular interest in health law, having 
previously studied public health in a master’s program and having been 
steeped in the health policy world while working in several congressional 
offices on Capitol Hill during the years immediately following the passage of 
the Affordable Care Act. What attracted me to a course in health law was thus 
a combination of motivations—a desire for information that I might one day 
use in practice, an interest in the discipline that grew out of my own 
(sometimes harrowing) brushes with the health care system and health 
insurance specifically, and a general scholarly curiosity about the areas of 
health law that I had not previously encountered. Admittedly, I also sought a 
compelling answer to a recurrent question from extended family and garrulous 
airplane row-mates: “Oh, you’re interested in health law? What is health law?” 
 
 47. Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, 12 HEALTH 
AFF. 24 (1993); see Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care’s Market Bureaucracy (draft on file with 
author). 
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What differentiated the classes devoted to health insurance and financing 
from other parts of the course was how implicit policy decisions are in shaping 
these areas of law. During other units, Professor Hoffman would pause 
instruction after identifying the black letter law so that we could weigh the 
implications of the rules or doctrines we were learning (e.g., Should physicians 
have a duty to treat patients? Are EMTALA’s48 requirements of screening, 
stabilization, and transfer for emergency medical services a net positive or net 
negative for our health care system?). While discussing health insurance 
regulation, however, questions about social values were ubiquitous and 
unavoidable—choices about what our health system should prioritize so clearly 
undergirded every design decision, from how managed care is structured to the 
rationale for applying ACA cost-sharing subsidies only to plans silver-level or 
higher in value, that engaging in full-stop policy discussions would have been 
redundant. The ultimate effect of regulatory choices or specific provisions of 
the ACA became clear only when judged as part of the law’s overall design 
and the shape of the health care system as a whole, as the Supreme Court’s 
decision in King v. Burwell49 so distinctly demonstrated. In other words, it 
became clear to me that it is no more possible to extract and divorce a 
particular health law doctrine from its social and political implications than it 
is to view a statutory provision in isolation from its surrounding statutory 
context. 
This recognition that normative decisions were inextricable from the 
doctrine itself—and that in enacting a statute or promulgating an insurance 
regulation, Congress and administrative agencies, respectively, must confront 
difficult questions about who should be covered, when, and why—is what 
made the insurance unit among the most illuminating of the semester. And it 
unexpectedly shifted the way I think about areas of law that are similarly laced 
with thorny contextual and normative decisions, such as business, tax, and 
administrative law. Rather than merely learning and mentally filing away the 
black letter law, I found myself trying to get to the bottom of the should and 
the why of the doctrine as I read—for instance, should the degree of deference 
a court gives an executive agency depend on whether the agency is attempting 
to enhance regulation of an industry or to deregulate? Why is the interest on a 
home mortgage tax deductible but rent is not? What normative choices 
underlie this decision? Having developed a heightened attention to underlying 
policy and normative decisions while studying health insurance regulation, I 
feel more attuned to the richness and complexity of legal doctrines generally. 
Within only weeks of beginning the course, I realized that health law—and 
health insurance regulation in particular—was far more pervasive and 
multifaceted than I had previously understood. Before taking the class, I 
 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012). 
 49. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
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thought of health law, and health insurance regulation in particular, as a fairly 
idiosyncratic field. I was surprised to learn instead that it poses many of the 
same questions that regularly occupy the federal judiciary in other contexts: 
How are we to understand Congress’s commerce power?50 To what extent 
should context and congressional intent be considered when interpreting a 
potentially ambiguous statute?51 How broadly should “personhood” be 
construed?52 When should justiciability concerns preclude a court from ruling 
on the merits of a claim?53 How does (or should) the Court interpret 
preemption language in federal statutes (e.g., ERISA’s “relates to”) and how 
do such decisions affect the balance of power between state and federal 
governments?54 It was both surprising and refreshing to recognize that 
understanding modern jurisprudence, especially after the passage of the ACA, 
essentially requires an understanding of health insurance (and, similarly, that 
understanding health insurance demands engaging with the Court’s recent 
jurisprudence). 
Perhaps the greatest challenge of learning this material was to master the 
details without losing sight of the big picture. It became clear to me that 
tugging at any of the threads we were learning could yield a trove of 
fascinating policy decisions and political backdrop—much of which was 
beyond the scope of a fourteen-week course. How and why were certain 
essential health benefits chosen for guaranteed coverage under the ACA, and 
others left out? How is it that the law could have overlooked such glaring gaps 
in coverage as those exemplified by the “family glitch”55 or the “Rick from 
Tennessee” example that Professor Hoffman discusses above?56 Stepping back 
from these in-the-weeds questions, more foundational inquiries often loomed. 
Why does health insurance remain so often tied to employment, particularly 
today when the average baby boomer holds more than eleven jobs before the 
age of fifty?57 Does this system still make sense? What would an alternative 
 
 50. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 51. See, e.g., King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
 52. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797 (2014). 
 53. See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 67–69 (D.D.C. 
2015). 
 54. See, e.g., Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016). 
 55. Tricia Brooks, Health Policy Brief: The Family Glitch, HEALTH AFF. (Nov. 10, 2014), 
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_129.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
JX6H-PHRD] (“The problem is that the definition of ‘affordable’—for both an individual 
employee and a family—is based only on the cost of individual-only coverage and does not take 
into consideration the often significantly higher cost of a family plan.”). 
 56. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 57. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NEWS RELEASE: NUMBER OF JOBS HELD, LABOR 
MARKET ACTIVITY, AND EARNINGS GROWTH AMONG THE YOUNGEST BABY BOOMERS: 
RESULTS FROM A LONGITUDINAL SURVEY 2 (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ 
pdf/nlsoy.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X8J-N9TN]. 
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look like? More than most classes, this one left me craving more—more 
context, more political backdrop, more comparative information about how the 
challenges of our health care system measure up to those of other countries, 
more insight into how health insurance will be conceptualized and effectuated 
in the future. I may have left the class with more questions than answers—
questions that have only become more urgent in the wake of the 2016 election, 
as we await the future of the ACA and health care regulation—but for me, 
these questions affirm my interest in continuing to examine this extensive field 
of law. 
B. Challenging Preconceptions of Health Care Reform: Reflections by 
Lindsay Cutler 
An interest in health care access is what led me to Health Law and Policy 
at UCLA. Prior to law school, I worked on the outreach campaign for NMHIX, 
the New Mexico Health Insurance Exchange, and on the New Mexico 
Medicaid expansion. After seeing the implementation of the ACA on the 
ground, I imagined the entire course would be a semester of precisely the 
health insurance regulation and reform “fire-hose” this Article discusses. 
While I quickly found out that health law and policy is broader than I had 
anticipated, I looked forward most to the part of the course on the ACA. The 
process of learning about health insurance reform felt like a sort of bungee-
jump—a plunge into the technical depths of ERISA or legal challenges to the 
ACA’s individual mandate58 and then rebounding to ask 10,000-foot questions 
about how the ACA attempted to fill in the cracks in health care access and to 
wrap around such an employer-dependent health care financing system. 
As became most clear to me in this unit, there is something unique about 
studying health care in a law school classroom—few subjects taught in law 
school are as deeply personal. Throughout the semester my classmates and I 
connected with the material in many different ways, as revealed through 
anecdotes about run-ins with student health insurance or past professional 
experience in the health care field. The unit on health insurance regulation and 
reform was the part of the class where I saw our entry points into the material 
diverging the most. Some classmates’ perspectives stemmed from the 
physician in their family, others from a sick relative or from being denied 
insurance coverage because of a preexisting condition. This vast array of 
background perspectives, compounded by the effect of the headline news 
shaping our frames of reference, fueled our perceptions and misperceptions of 
the subject. For example, many of us, accustomed to hearing that the ACA 
offered affordable coverage for all, were shocked to find out just how many 
 
 58. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (holding that the 
individual mandate to purchase health insurance under the Affordable Care Act was constitutional 
under the Tax and Spending Clause). 
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people were left out of the expansion and just how many holes remained after 
the ACA’s patchworking. Professor Hoffman navigated our different 
perspectives by reminding us of the big picture: whether it was a colorful 
hypothetical or our own experience, these individualized interactions with 
insurance and doctors were powerfully indicative of the path that health care 
reform was taking. 
The area I recall struggling with most was the concept of ERISA 
preemption and the gap that remains for those whose only remedy for wrongful 
denial of benefits in an employer health plan is the nominal payment of 
benefits denied and of future benefits, since ERISA preempts state tort claims 
and remedies for harms stemming from such denials.59 Though not the subject 
I was most excited to learn, seeing the pitfalls of ERISA strengthened my 
understanding of the evolution of health care financing in the United States. To 
me, the takeaway from ERISA was that it denied individuals caught between 
state and federal law meaningful access to the health care system. I saw ERISA 
as representative of the extent to which market forces shape insurance in the 
public and private spheres and the way in which the struggle for regulation of 
employer-based insurance is rife with public and administrative tensions. 
Moving from ground level to 10,000 and then 30,000 feet by 
understanding first the technicalities and then the policy implications of 
ERISA preemption also helped me see how the macro goals of health care 
reform—increasing access, reducing cost, and improving quality—can pull in 
opposite directions. Though limiting benefits may reduce spending for 
employee plans, individuals can also be denied life-saving treatment or be 
barred from accessing meaningful care. The complexity of ERISA, and the 
market forces at play in removing employee claims from state law through 
preemption, deepened my appreciation of how the systems I had previously 
worked with on the ground, NMHIX and New Mexico Medicaid, were in 
theory designed to do the opposite: to increase access to meaningful care, 
where such access may not have previously existed. It seems even more 
important, in the context of ERISA’s impact, for individuals, even possibly 
those who are able to obtain benefits through an employee plan, to have the 
option to access health care outside of the employer context. Having the ability 
to purchase a plan on the health care exchange and, in turn, to seek full legal 
recourse for harms stemming from benefits denials is another way that the 
exchanges and Medicaid expansion could provide increased access. 
What struck me most deeply in thinking about the particular reforms the 
ACA embraced was an article we started the course with entitled “Getting 
There from Here,” by Dr. Atul Gawande. In it Gawande describes the path-
dependent nature of health reform in various countries over the last century.60 
 
 59. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004). 
 60. Atul Gawande, Getting There from Here, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 26, 2009). 
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Gawande, writing before the ACA passed, tracked other countries’ health care 
systems, reforms, and problems to their social and political roots—what he 
called their particular origin stories.61 Path dependence, as presented in the 
article, is the theory that small, historical events play a powerful and 
underestimated role in shaping current health care reform. This article helped 
me understand how U.S. health care financing came to be so patchworked, and 
I have returned to it repeatedly both for answers and for inspiration for further 
study. 
I walked away from Health Law and Policy with a deeper understanding of 
the complexity of our health care system’s problems and the rationales behind 
the ACA’s often perplexing policies. But so much of what I loved learning and 
found fascinating and motivating a year ago has changed since the November 
2016 election. Taking this survey course in the Spring of 2016 and reflecting 
on it in the months since has taught me to think critically about the design of 
essential care systems, who and what they are intended to exclude, and how 
that reflects national social values. My health law classmates and I are 
certainly not the only ones thinking about these underlying social values at 
present, as moves to dismantle the ACA have provoked Americans and others 
around the globe to ask, sometimes in gut-turning disbelief, “wait, just how do 
we get there from here?” 
CONCLUSION: 
WHAT I TAKE AWAY FROM MY STUDENTS FOR MY FUTURE TEACHING 
My conversations with Lindsay and Whitney and their reflections on 
learning in my class affirmed that teaching health insurance regulation and 
reform in a survey health law class is tricky and will undoubtedly be imperfect. 
One could spend a lifetime—and many, including myself, do—thinking about 
the nuances of health insurance policy and regulation and the many values 
imbedded in it. The challenge, as I see it, is how to impart the high points for 
practicing health law and to cultivate erudite law graduates. 
As this Article has described, my primary strategy is to zoom in on the 
technical rules or legal reasoning and then pull back out to see the effect that 
they have on people’s lives and livelihoods. This process reveals how technical 
rules embody and reinforce social values. In conversation with Lindsay and 
Whitney, I thought about how this strategy, which Lindsay nicely described as 
the bungee-jump approach, forces students to pivot quickly between minutia 
and the big picture. What struck me is that both of my students recognized this 
telescoping in and out in class, and each experienced it differently. For 
Whitney, this approach illuminated where macro questions and social values 
are rooted in detailed statutes and doctrine. It helped her see policy and law as 
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more fluid domains. For Lindsay, this bungee jump was novel and yet 
somewhat jarring as we moved through the material in the class, but it 
eventually enabled her to fit the many pieces we studied into a coherent whole, 
which she did in part relying on the Gawande article she describes as a guide. 
Seeing how two successful students responded differently was telling. 
Fortunately, it affirmed that they were learning much of what I hoped they 
would. It also revealed the moments where I could work to make some of my 
intended messages come through more clearly, or with more ease, for my 
students. 
One insight was to make the course’s implicit themes more explicit. For 
example, I realized that I never clearly elucidated the idea, described in the 
Introduction to this Article, that I see insurance as both an expression of and 
force that shapes social values. This idea motivates the way I approach this 
material, and it could help students to understand my vantage on the journey 
through it. I taught the course again as we drafted this Article, and I paused 
early in the unit to unravel this idea while discussing the ACA policy that 
someone buying health insurance on an exchange may be charged fifty percent 
higher premiums if she uses tobacco products.62 We examined how this 
insurance regulation reflects social disapproval of tobacco use, a discussion 
that was especially interesting with the participation of several international 
LL.M. students, including a student from France whose difficulty wrapping her 
mind around this rule illustrated its particular cultural valence. 
As another example, in this last iteration of the course, I referred back to 
the Gawande article to mark the idea of path dependence more explicitly, as 
Lindsay was doing on her own. Expressly discussing the theme of path 
dependence provided the opportunity to challenge Gawande’s thesis that path 
dependence is inevitable, by asking students to imagine alternate universes that 
the ACA might have created. This discussion, in turn, teases out questions that 
Whitney was left to ponder on her own at the end of the course. Was Medicare 
for all an option back in 2010? Would it have been better? Is our employer-
based health insurance system a done deal or might its prominence lessen over 
time? Even if its prominence remains, will and must it substantively remain 
largely deregulated? If so, what is the cost of such deregulation? What might 
be the next steps in health insurance reform and will they be future chapters in 
a story of path dependence? 
As part of this theme of path dependence, I also shared an idea that I have 
written about elsewhere: the places where the ACA is most controversial, 
resulting in public uproar and ligation, are the very places where it pushes most 
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strongly away from the preexisting system and its norms.63 The individual 
mandate faces resistance in part because it cuts against the notion of free 
market private insurance and more strongly toward a solidaristic system of 
health insurance. The ACA’s requirement that employer plans cover all 
preventive care without cost sharing, including FDA-approved forms of 
contraception, violates ERISA’s zone of deregulation for employer plans.64 
The ACA can thus be seen as simultaneously path dependent and path 
changing. What is now fascinating is that the ACA has quickly become the 
path on which the future of health insurance is dependent, a point that 
Republicans in Congress and President Trump must contend with as they 
contemplate making significant changes to the ACA. 
Finally, and relatedly, my students’ insights suggested the need to spend 
more time teaching the historical origins of the current system—from the 
initiation and instantiation of the employer-based health care financing system 
to Medicare and Medicaid to ERISA and the evolution of managed care. I 
started teaching health law just prior to its modern transformation by the ACA 
and have debated the right balance of pre- and post-ACA content. 
Understanding the preexisting state of health care illuminates the very 
problems that prompted the ACA. Each year, I add more nuance on the history 
of health care delivery and financing and, especially, the evolution of managed 
care. Some of the greatest puzzles in health law exist because of the quickly 
changing picture of how we pay for health care in the United States, from 
mostly out-of-pocket at the beginning of the twentieth century to a convoluted 
insurance system by the end, to whatever will come next. Laws that made 
sense (or at least caused little trouble) at one moment in time, such as ERISA 
section 502 preemption rules at a time when insurers did not deny care 
prospectively, can have untoward effects at a later moment. When teaching 
about an area of regulation that is ever-changing, it can be easy to phase out 
older material in favor of present controversies, but Whitney’s insights 
reminded me that the former may be necessary to illuminate the latter. 
I realize, as I weave in more history, that many of my own views on health 
insurance regulation and reform and what is possible are informed by my 
knowledge of this history and how health care financing and regulation has 
changed over time (and could, impliedly, continue to change in the future). 
This past semester, I devoted even more time to this historical arc to impart a 
foundational knowledge in the same way that my health law and policy 
professors, Ted Marmor and Jerry Mashaw, did for me a decade and a half ago. 
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What I remember from my own health law and policy class in law school is not 
the details of Stark Law rules or antitrust doctrine (in fact, I’m fairly certain 
my professors didn’t touch on this doctrine). What I remember is the two of 
them prodding me and my classmates with questions like whether nonprofit 
hospitals still deserve tax-exempt status in the modern era of health care big 
business and what role and profit margins private insurance companies should 
have in our health care financing system. They gave me insight into the 
tremendous impact evolving legal rules and policies have on society as a 
whole, and on individuals’ lives—a connection that now motivates my own 
research and teaching. 
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